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ABOUT THIS PAPER
  A significant challenge when writing this paper was the very wide definition used in 
institutional classifications to categorize states as fragile and conflict-affected. The range of 
countries included makes distinguishing a fragile state from a generally weak state difficult. 
This paper is not framed around institutional lists but rather uses a criteria-based approach 
focused on deficits in government capacity (see section 3.1).
  Fragility often occurs only in certain areas within a country, while other areas remain 
relatively unaffected, for example in north-east Nigeria at the time of writing. Throughout 
the paper we refer to fragile and conflict affected settings (FCAS), to reflect this reality. We 
give greater emphasis to settings where deficits are particularly significant.
  Within the broad categorization of FCAS, each setting varies considerably e.g. acute 
emergencies, chronic emergencies, large-scale population movements as refugees or 
internally-displaced, and conflict. Each setting has implications for policy recommendations. 
This paper does not address each specific setting but lays the foundation for more detailed 
analysis.
The motivation for the paper is to review existing health financing policy recommendations and 
consider whether, and if so how, these need revising given the challenging context of FCAS. 
The paper aims to inform policy i.e. the decisions and actions of those engaged in financing and 
delivering health services in FCAS, and its scope is limited to this agenda. We are particularly 
interested in the perspective of public policy given its central importance for the long-term 
development of health systems, and as such is closely linked to the humanitarian development 
nexus agenda, which tries to ensure better connectivity between humanitarian and development 
efforts as highlighted during the World Humanitarian Summit [1].
  Section 1 provides broader context, Section 2 summarizes WHO’s general policy messages 
on health financing, and Section 3 looks more closely at definitions of fragility and overall 
health system challenges in FCAS. Section 4 describes the current situation in FCAS in 
terms of the health financing functions and draws heavily on a detailed literature review 
of the evidence and secondary data analysis commissioned from the ReBUILD Consortium, 
published separately as a WHO Health Financing Working Paper. Section 5 builds on Section 
4 and develops specific recommendations for health financing policy development and 
implementation in FCAS.
vii 
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  Extreme	 poverty,	 premature	mortality,	 and	 ill	 health	 are	 increasingly	 concentrated	 in	
settings	 characterized	 by	 fragility	 and	 conflict	 (FCAS),	 often	 within	 otherwise	 stable	
countries. FCAS	are	characterized	by	an	increasing	burden	of	disease,	an	increased	risk	of	injuries	
and	illnesses	associated	with	violence,	resurgent	infectious	diseases,	mental	health	problems,	and	
deteriorating	food	security.	At	the	same	time,	household	incomes	tend	to	reduce,	with	a	negative	
impact on coping strategies.
  The	 extent	 of	 fragility	 and	 conflict	 can	 vary	 substantially	within	 a	 country,	 and	health	
financing	solutions	need	to	be	adapted	to	reflect	this.	Crises	are	often	localized	and	dynamic,	
improving	or	deteriorating	rapidly	in	the	short-term.	There	may	also	be	a	deficit	in	a	governments’	
political	 legitimacy	 as	 well	 as	 in	 its	 capacity	 to	 ensure	 security.	 These	 contextual	 differences	
within	a	country	translate	into	greater	complexity	and	diversity	in	revenue	flows,	from	domestic,	
development	 and	 humanitarian	 sources.	 Adapting	 health	 financing	 solutions	 to	 this	 changing	
context	is	important,	while	remaining	cognisant	of	the	guiding	principles	for	health	financing	policy.
  As	 domestic	 public	 revenues	 fall,	 the	 capacity	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 willingness,	 of	
government	to	deliver	essential	services	and	ensure	financial	protection	reduces.	Lower 
levels	of	prepayment	and	pooled	funding	 in	FCAS,	and	the	 increased	reliance	on	out-of-pocket	
payments	which	results,	 is	particularly	problematic	for	universal	health	coverage	(UHC).	 In	turn,	
this	creates	a	significant	barrier	to	accessing	services,	and	is	a	major	reason	why	people	postpone	
or	forego	health	care	in	FCAS,	despite	increased	health	needs.
  External	funding	for	both	humanitarian	and	development	programmes	plays	a	critical	role	
in	maintaining	the	public	nature	of	funding	for	the	health	system,	and	in	safeguarding	the	
provision	of	essential	personal	health	services,	as	well	as	population	level	interventions.	
Ensuring	that	multiple	new	external	sources	of	funds	are	pooled,	or	at	a	minimum	well-coordinated,	
is	essential	 to	minimize	fragmentation,	duplication,	and	prevent	unnecessary	complexity	 in	the	
health	 system.	 External	 funds	 should	 be	 channelled	 through	 and	 strengthen	 domestic	 public	
systems	 wherever	 possible;	 where	 not	 feasible,	 substitute	 mechanisms	 should	 be	 established	
which	mirror	public	 functions	 and	build	national	 institutions	 and	processes.	 From	 the	outset	 a	
vision	should	be	in	place	for	transition	to	domestic	ownership.
  Humanitarian	funding	can	 learn	from	development	funding	efforts	to	 improve	pooling	
and	make	purchasing	more	strategic,	for	example	through	contracting	service	provision.	
In	post-conflict	 settings,	 pooled	development	 funds	have	used	 contracting	 to	 scale	up	 service	
delivery	and	 improve	efficiency;	 furthermore,	 this	approach	has	proved	resilient	where	conflict	
has	 re-emerged.	 Initiatives	 to	pool	humanitarian	 funds	 (e.g.	Common	Humanitarian	Funds,	 the	
first	established	in	the	DRC	in	2006)	are	promising	but	could	become	more	strategic,	for	example	
by	contracting	service	provision	during	protracted	conflict.	Incremental	measures,	such	as	pooling	
humanitarian	 funds	 for	 centralized	 procurement,	 logistics	 and	 supply	 chain	 management,	 are	
important	foundational	measures.
  Increased	dependence	on	external	 funding	brings	with	 it	 influence	over	plans,	policies	
and	 implementation	 capacity,	 which	 can	 be	 either	 supportive	 or	 undermining	 of	 local	
leadership,	systems,	and	capacity.	In	FCAS,	increased	dependence	on	external	assistance	has	
frequently	contributed	to	fragmentation,	duplication	of	services,	dilution	and	distortion	of	limited	
human	and	financial	 resources,	 and	weak	 coordination	between	 levels	of	 care.	 It	 can,	however,	
also	play	a	positive	role	for	example	by	establishing	mechanisms,	for	provider	contracting	as	 in	
Cambodia	and	Afghanistan.
Key	Messages
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  Ensuring	 coordinated	 and	 coherent	 interventions	 across	 humanitarian	 actors,	 as	 well	
as	 between	 humanitarian	 and	 development	 operations,	 is	 critical	 both	 for	 short	 term	
effectiveness	and	 for	 the	development	of	a	 resilient	health	system	 in	 the	 longer	 term.	
Decisions	 made	 during	 the	 humanitarian	 response	 phase	 can	 significantly	 impact	 the	 future	
pathway	of	a	health	system,	a	concern	for	the	Humanitarian	Development	Nexus	agenda.	One	
issue	 to	 address	 is	 the	 current	 separation	of	 the	humanitarian	 and	development	 responses,	 in	
terms	of	funding	streams,	operational	modalities,	and	staffing,	which	does	not	reflect	the	dynamic	
nature	of	many	settings	(see	Annex	2).	
  Financing	disease	surveillance,	 information	systems,	enforcement	of	health	protection	
laws	and	regulations,	planning	and	management	of	national	strategies	for	health	security,	
and	other	common	goods	for	health	is	a	priority	in	FCAS	given	the	increased	risks	to	health	
security.	 As	 governments	 in	 FCAS	 often	 have	 significantly	 reduced	 fiscal	 capacity,	 external	
funding	is	critical	 in	the	continued	provision	of	these	core,	population-based	goods	and	related	
functions.
  Where	feasible,	supporting	core	systems	such	as	those	required	to	pay	salaries	should	
take	 precedence	 over	 more	 complex	 payment	 methods.	 While	 a	 guiding	 principle	 of	
health	financing	policy	 is	 to	move	away	from	 input-based	 line	 item	provider	payment,	 in	FCAS	
ensuring	that	basic	 inputs	are	 in	place	should	take	priority.	The	 increased	 influence	of	external	
actors	frequently	leads	to	experimentation	with	new	health	financing	approaches,	such	as	pay-
for-performance	 (P4P).	While	 these	may	bring	much	needed	 resources	 to	 front-line	services,	 it	
is	advisable	to	review	the	current	approaches	to	 its	 implementation	 in	 low-	and	middle-income	
countries,	 including	FCAS,	and	consider	how	 these	 can	be	adjusted	 to	each	context,	weighting	
carefully	 risks	 and	 implementation	 costs,	 including	 verification	 approaches.	 Furthermore,	 P4P	
should be viewed as a complementary and not the main payment method.
  While	cash	and	voucher	assistance	(CVA)	modalities	can	improve	access	to	and	the	use	of	
health	services	in	humanitarian	settings,	supply-side	support	for	service	delivery	is	also	
required.	Unconditional	or	unrestricted	cash	transfers	can	help	individuals	to	meet	both	health	
and	non-health	needs	but	should	not	inadvertently	contribute	to	a	fee-charging	culture	for	priority	
services,	which	could	pose	a	challenge	for	UHC	in	the	longer	run.	CVA	modalities	should	therefore	
be	considered	only	as	a	complement	to	support	for	the	supply	of	health	services.	Vouchers	can	
improve	equity	in	financing	when	they	increase	access	to	priority	services	for	the	vulnerable,	and	
leverage	improvements	in	the	quality	and	efficiency	of	service	delivery.	With	respect	to	the	health	
sector,	multipurpose	cash	transfers	should	ideally	focus	on	covering	the	indirect	costs	of	access	
(e.g.	transport),	while	point-of-use	fees	are	minimized	or	zero.
  Where	 possible	 crisis-affected	 vulnerable	 population	 groups,	 such	 as	 refugees	 or	 the	
internally-displaced,	 should	 be	 incorporated	 into	 existing	 national	 health	 coverage	
schemes.	Furthermore,	 if	a	separate	purchasing	agency	for	health	services	exists,	e.g.	a	health	
insurance	agency,	this	should	be	used	to	purchase	services	for	such	populations	to	avoid	creating	
new	purchasing	arrangements	and	hence	avoid	generating	greater	fragmentation	in	the	way	the	
health	system	is	financed.
Key	Messages	contd.
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1. THE BROADER CONTEXT
  Approximately two billion people now 
live in states which are affected by 
fragility and conflict. In 2015, fragile 
contexts were home to 514 million people 
living in extreme poverty and by 2030, 
without significant action, this number is 
expected to rise to 620 million people. As 
a result, approximately 80% of the world’s 
poorest may be living in fragile contexts 
by that time [2]. Eighty percent of 
epidemics, half of deaths under the age of 
five, and more than one third of maternal 
deaths occur in situations characterized 
by fragility and conflict [3].
  Out of twenty-two countries in WHO’s 
Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMRO), 
nine are experiencing either an acute 
or protracted emergency [4]. Almost 30 
million displaced people, more than half 
of all displaced persons globally, originate 
from the Eastern Mediterranean Region. 
In the WHO African Region (AFRO) there 
are currently ten humanitarian crises with 
significant public health consequences 
[5]. The Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the 
Republic of Yemen continue to experience 
large and complex humanitarian crises1.
  The increasing fragility being experienced 
globally, highlighted above, presents a 
serious challenge for progress towards 
universal health coverage (UHC). In 
light of, and in response to this evolving 
context, this paper reviews WHO’s 
policy messages on health financing. 
Current policy messages build on the 
health systems framework, a functional 
approach to analysis based on revenue 
raising, pooling, purchasing and benefit 
design, and a set of core policy messages, 
signposts, and guiding principles.
1	 	A	complex	emergency	can	be	defined	as	a	humanitarian	
crisis	in	a	country,	region	or	society	where	there	is	a	total	or	
considerable	breakdown	of	authority	resulting	from	internal	
or	external	conflict,	and	which	requires	an	international	
response	that	goes	beyond	the	mandate	or	capacity	of	any	
single	agency	and/or	the	ongoing	UN	country	programme.	
See	6.	UNHCR.	Coordination	in	Complex	Emergencies.	2001	
[cited	2019	30	April	2019];	Available	from:	https://www.
unhcr.org/partners/partners/3ba88e7c6/coordination-
complex-emergencies.html.	
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  WHO’s work on health financing builds 
on the World Health Report 2000 [7], 
which focuses on four key functions 
of a health system, one of which is 
health financing2. The health financing 
function is further unpacked into three 
subfunctions, namely revenue raising, 
pooling of funds, and purchasing of 
services, as well as policy on the design of 
benefits as show in Box 1 [9].
  It is around these health financing 
subfunctions that policy is developed 
in all health systems, whether that 
system is labelled a tax-based system, 
a health insurance-based system or a 
mixed system. WHO’s recommendations 
around each of these subfunctions is 
guided by the health system objectives 
i.e. how can policies on revenue raising, 
pooling those revenues, and using them 
to purchase benefits, be designed in a 
way that contributes to progress towards 
UHC goals and, ultimately, improvements 
in population health (Fig. 1). Under 
Sustainable Development Goal 3, target 
3.8 relates to UHC and is measured in 
terms of two indicators, 3.8.1 for service 
coverage i.e. utilization of essential health 
2	 	A	subsequent	WHO	report	unpacked	these	further	into	six	
building	blocks	one	of	which	is	health	financing.	8.	World	
Health	Organization,	Everybody’s	business:	strengthening	
health	systems	to	improve	health	outcomes.	WHO’s	
framework	for	action	2007:	Geneva.
services3 [10], and 3.8.2 for financial 
protection measured in terms of those 
households suffering catastrophic health 
expenditures. 
  WHO has well-developed guidance 
for each of the health financing 
subfunctions, building on a set of 
guiding principles which draw on both 
normative thinking and empirical 
evidence (see Box 1). The guiding 
principles focus heavily on the important 
role of government, particularly in terms 
of financing, to make progress towards 
UHC. Recommendations include taking 
measures to reduce fragmentation in the 
pooling of revenues, and to allocate these 
revenues to purchase services in a way 
which steers the health system in a more 
equitable, and efficient direction. The 
role of public institutions in facilitating 
financial arrangements, and in providing 
an appropriate and coherent incentive and 
regulatory environment across the health 
system is also central to UHC progress, a 
role which is often severely weakened in 
FCAS.
3	 	Defined	as	“the	average	coverage	of	essential	services	
based	on	tracer	interventions	that	include	reproductive,	
maternal,	newborn	and	child	health,	infectious	diseases,	
non-communicable	diseases	and	service	capacity	and	
access,	among	the	general	and	the	most	disadvantaged	
population”	10.	 World	Health	Organization	and	The	World	
Bank,	Tracking	universal	health	coverage:	2017	global	
monitoring	report.	2017	Geneva..
2.		WHO’S	GENERAL	GUIDANCE	
ON HEALTH FINANCING 
POLICY	IN	SUPPORT	OF	UHC
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  The guiding principles have been 
translated into a set of detailed 
questions in the form of a Health 
Financing Progress Matrix, to facilitate 
an assessment of health financing 
policy at the country level [12]. The 
questions relate to core features of a 
health financing system which are of 
particular importance to make progress 
towards UHC, in that they represent or 
embody one of the guiding principles.
Figure 1: WHO’s	framework	for	health	financing	and	UHC
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a)	Introduction
Health	financing	 reforms	 cannot	 simply	be	 imported	 from	one	 country	 to	another	given	 the	
unique	context	of	each	country	and	its	starting	point	in	terms	of	health	financing	arrangements;	
the	underlying	causes	of	performance	problems	differ	 in	each	country	and	 it	 is	 these	causes	
which	the	 reforms	proposed	 in	a	health	financing	strategy	must	address.	However,	 there	are	
lessons	 from	 international	 experience	 that	 allow	 a	 number	 of	 guiding	 principles	 for	 reforms	
which	support	progress	towards	UHC,	to	be	specified.	These	do	not	constitute	a	“how-to”	guide,	
but	rather	a	set	of	“signposts”	that	can	be	used	to	check	whether	reform	strategies	(and	more	
importantly,	 reform	 implementation)	 create	an	appropriate	 incentive	environment	and	hence	
are	pointing	and	moving	in	the	right	direction	in	terms	of	objectives	and	goals	in	Figure	1.	These	
principles,	or	signposts,	are	presented	below	for	each	of	the	health	financing	sub-functions	and	
policy areas:
1)	Revenue	raising
	 	Move	towards	a	predominant	reliance	on	public/compulsory	funding	sources	(i.e.	some	form	
of	taxation)
	 	Increase	predictability	in	the	level	of	public	(and	external)	funding	over	a	period	of	years
	 	Improve	stability	(i.e.	regular	budget	execution)	in	the	flow	of	public	(and	external)	funds
2)	Pooling	revenues
	 	Enhance	the	redistributive	capacity	of	available	prepaid	funds
	 	Enable	explicit	complementarity	of	different	funding	sources
	 	Reduce	fragmentation,	duplication	and	overlap
	 	Simplify	financial	flows
3)	Purchasing	services
	 	Increase	the	extent	to	which	the	allocation	of	resources	to	providers	is	linked	to	population	
health	needs,	information	on	provider	performance,	or	a	combination	of	both
	 	Move	away	from	the	extremes	of	either	rigid,	input-based	line	item	budgets	or	completely	
unmanaged	fee-for-service	reimbursement
	 	Manage	expenditure	growth,	for	example	by	avoiding	open-ended	commitments	in	provider	
payment arrangements
	 	Move	towards	a	unified	data	platform	on	patient	activity,	even	if	there	are	multiple	health	
financing	/	health	coverage	schemes
4)	Benefit	design	and	rationing	mechanisms
	 	Clarify	the	population’s	legal	entitlements	and	obligations	(who	is	entitled	to	what	services,	
and	what,	if	anything,	they	are	they	meant	to	pay	at	the	point	of	use)
	 	Improve	the	population’s	awareness	of	both	their	legal	entitlements	and	their	obligations	as	
beneficiaries
	 	Align	promised	benefits,	or	entitlements,	with	provider	payment	mechanisms
Box 2: WHO’s	guiding	principles	and	guideposts	on	health	financing	for	UHC
Source:	[11]
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3.1.  DEFINITIONS OF FRAGILITY
  Fragility is a multidimensional con-
cept, encompassing economic, environ-
mental, political, societal and security 
criteria [2]. It is an umbrella term, 
which covers very different settings 
which are fragile for different reasons. 
Based on these criteria, some broad lists 
include countries as different as Somalia, 
Pakistan, Nigeria and Solomon Islands.
  For the purposes of this paper we 
follow the criteria-based of weaknesses 
or deficits in government capacities, 
two of which are of particular rele-
vance [13]. These include deficits in a 
government’s capacity and willingness to 
ensure the provision of basic services to its 
population, especially vulnerable groups, 
and deficits in a government’s ability to 
provide security and stability; these two 
deficits have clear implications for current 
health financing recommendations; the 
third deficit concerns the legitimacy of 
government in FCAS.
  Countries with deficits across these 
criteria face the most intractable 
challenges of fragility; Call [14] uses 
a proxy measure for these domains 
according to the combination of gaps they 
exhibit. Annex 1 summarizes formal or 
institutional classifications of fragile and 
conflict-affected states, or settings.
  The deficits in government capacity 
approach provides a useful basis to 
review WHO’s current health finan-
cing policy recommendations. These 
recommendations are appropriate 
for many of the countries included in 
FCAS lists; it is, however, in countries 
displaying significant deficits in both 
capacities that entirely different modes 
of operationalization of health financing 
policy are often required or given greater 
prominence; this is where current 
recommendations on health financing 
policy are most likely to need revisiting. 
In general, this paper gives greater focus 
to such settings.
  It is important to note that the degree 
of fragility may vary within a country, 
with multiple settings occurring simul-
taneously, e.g. in Nigeria and DRC [15]. 
Within a state classified as FCAS there are 
often areas of stability where recognized 
authorities still provide essential services 
and maintain security. Analysis may also 
take a regional perspective e.g. spill-overs 
of conflict and fragility from one country 
to another. For these reasons we use the 
acronym FCAS to refer to “settings” rather 
than “states”.
  Fragile and conflict affected settings 
are often dynamic, progressing and 
regressing within relatively short time 
periods. Attempts have been made to 
categorize stages of fragility, for example 
deterioration, collapsed, emergency, 
recovering, stabilizing, with movement 
forwards and backwards between these 
settings over time often observed. Annex 
2 provides more information on attempts 
by a number of institutions to categorize 
3.		HEALTH,	UHC	AND	HEALTH	
FINANCING IN FCAS
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HighLow
Humanitarian-development- peace
typologies of response and engagement scenarios
TYPE 1
CONSTRAINED 
Government is unwilling 
to uphold its obligation 
and responsibility to 
protect, and is limiting the 
scope of international 
involvement 
TYPE 2
CAPACITY-DRIVEN 
Government/authority 
upholds its responsibility, 
but little to low capacity, 
low ongoing budget 
support 
TYPE 3
CONSULTATIVE 
Strong and ‘responsible 
‘government/authority, 
recovering or emerging 
political settlement, high 
intensity or active conﬂict/ 
insecure operational 
context
TYPE 5
COMPREHENSIVE 
‘Failed State Scenario’ 
government shirks 
responsibility, in the midst 
of active, high intensity 
conﬂict situation
TYPE 4
COLLABORATIVE 
Government/authority is 
willing and able to uphold 
its obligation and 
responsibility to protect in 
a stable situation and has 
adequate capacity to 
respond 
HighLow
HighLow
Responsibility
Capacity/resources
Security/access
Figure 2: Humanitarian-development-peace	typologies	of	response	and	engagement	scenarios
different stages of fragility. In many 
settings, the situation is one of chronic 
problems and complex emergencies, in 
which strategies for humanitarian response 
and development start to converge.
  The dynamic nature of fragility 
highlights the importance of the human-
itarian development nexus, which 
aims to break down the dichotomous 
approach to supporting emergency and 
development settings, particularly by 
international agencies organized around 
separate funding streams, different 
interventions and operational modalities, 
and separate staff. The Humanitarian 
Development Nexus Task Team of the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 
has developed a typology (see Fig. 2) to 
frame different scenarios [15], which 
captures many of the same criteria used 
in Call’s diagram.
Source:	[15]
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3.2.		UHC	GOALS	AND	HEALTH	
SYSTEM CHALLENGES IN 
FCAS
3.2.1.  FCAS AND UNIVERSAL  
HEALTH COVERAGE
  FCAS are characterized by a rapidly 
changing burden of disease and 
in creased risk of epidemics; specifically, 
an increase in injuries and illnesses 
associated with violence is frequently 
observed, as is deteriorating food security, 
resurgent infectious diseases, mental 
health problems related to crisis, as well 
as the burden of chronic disease growing 
worldwide [16].
  Given the disruption to service provision 
and financing commonly faced, the use 
of health services tends to fall in FCAS. 
Data is only available at the national 
level, and the difference between states 
categorized as FCAS and non-FCAS are 
significant (43.4% as compared to 66.2%, 
p<0.05)4. However, coverage for essential 
health care (UHC index for 2015) shows a 
wide range of performance, from around 
20% for Somalia to more than 60% in 
Iraq [10]. 
  High reliance on out-of-pocket 
payments is particularly problematic 
for UHC, resulting from low levels of 
pre payment and pooled funding in 
FCAS. Underlying factors include low 
trust in public institutions leading to the 
disruption and fragmentation of pooling 
mechanisms which may occur during 
4	 	More	details	on	the	quantitative	analysis	are	available	in	
17.	 Witter,	S.,	et	al.,	Background	note	on	health	financing	
in	fragile	and	conflict-affected	settings,	in	Health	financing	
working	paper.	forthcoming:	Geneva,	Switzerland.
conflict [18]. In humanitarian settings, an 
influx of refugees or internally displaced 
populations can add to the separation or 
segmentation of schemes with populations 
either covered or not covered by different 
agencies with varying mandates, resources 
and benefit entitlements.
  While there are significant challenges 
regarding data on financial protection, 
on average fragile states have a 
significantly higher incidence of 
impoverishment due to out-of-pocket 
health spending (1.64% as compared to 
0.77%, p<0.05). However, the incidence 
varies from as low as 0.12% in DRC (at 
$1.90-a-day poverty live), 0.58% in 
Afghanistan to 2.05% in Burundi and 
2.98% in Cote d’Ivoire [10]. These figures 
should be viewed with caution however, 
given that financial protection may appear 
to be relatively good when service use is 
foregone, and household spending on 
health is low as a result. National averages 
can mask significant inequalities within 
a country, particularly for populations 
living in conflict affected areas.
  A fall in publicly funded provision of 
health services, combined with reduced 
household ability to pay, tends to 
exacerbate existing inequities in service 
use: analysis from Palestine suggests that 
with the exception of the primary-level, 
utilization of all levels of health care is 
significantly higher for the better-off [19], 
a finding common to other settings, but 
often more pronounced in FCAS.
  In terms of demand for health services, 
expected out-of-pocket costs constitute 
a significant reason for people to 
postpone or forego health care in many 
FCAS settings despite increased health 
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needs [20]. Meanwhile, certain FCAS 
settings are characterized by high levels 
of spending on medical care abroad, given 
health system challenges, which tends to 
be highly inequitable.
3.2.2.  HEALTH SYSTEM CHALLENGES IN 
FCAS
  In FCAS government capacity, and 
in some cases willingness, to ensure 
provision of essential health services 
and public health functions can be 
severely limited, for example in terms of 
ensuring functioning laboratory networks, 
and early response and surveillance 
systems. Liberia was heavily affected by 
the Ebola epidemic (2014-2016), and while 
still considered fragile in the preceding 
years [21], access to services had been 
improving since the civil war ended; 
despite this, the country had very little 
capacity for emergency epidemiological 
surveillance and response, and for 
diagnostic testing, which contributed to 
the spread of the 2014 Ebola epidemic [22] 
[23]. Yemen was making steady progress 
to the health MDGs for example in term of 
maternal mortality, but this has faltered 
since the escalation of the conflict in 2016. 
Only 51% of health facilities are currently 
fully functional. The core platforms and 
functions of the health system have been 
weakened due to the crisis, in part due to 
the brain drain of medical professionals, 
with many districts lacking doctors and 
specialists, and salaries not paid.
  A comprehensive review of health 
system characteristics in FCAS makes 
the following observations: limited 
capacity to provide health services 
to populations outside urban areas; 
ineffective or non-existent referral systems 
for the critically ill; a lack of infrastructure 
(including facilities, human resources, 
equipment and supplies, and medicines) 
to deliver health service effectively, 
much having been destroyed or severely 
compromised due to war and or neglect; 
non-existent or inadequate capacity-
building mechanisms and systems, such 
as national clinical training programmes; 
inadequate coordination, oversight and 
monitoring of health services; weak or 
absent processes to develop, establish and 
implement national health policies; non-
operational health information systems 
for planning, management and disease 
surveillance; and inadequate public 
finance management capacity such as 
for budgeting, accounting and human 
resource management [24].
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4.1.	 	RAISING	REVENUES	AND	
POOLING: THE SETTING IN 
FCAS
  FCAS are characterized by weaker fiscal 
capacity, as a result of lower economic 
growth rates, higher inflation, lower 
tax revenue to GDP ratios, larger 
government debt, and high dependence 
on official development assistance 
(ODA) [25]. In Iraq, for example, the 
combination of the ISIS insurgency in 
2011-13, followed by the halving of oil 
prices in 2014 led to a drop in government 
expenditure as a proportion of total 
health expenditure from around 75% in 
2011 to around 25% in 2015, which was 
exactly mirrored by a rise in out of pocket 
spending [26].
  The gap left by low and or reducing 
domestic public spending tends to be 
replaced by household direct out-of-
pocket spending, despite falling household 
income, and is often supported by family 
remittances from abroad, especially in 
countries with a large diaspora [27, 28]. 
One study on expenditure at private 
health providers in three zones of Somalia 
found that salaries and remittances were 
the main reported sources for families 
to finance health care, with 23.5% of 
households relying on remittances [29]. 
The increase in households out-of-pocket 
spending accompanied with the reduction 
in household’s revenues results in an 
increased proportion of households facing 
financial hardship.
  Countries defined as FCAS are asso-
ciated with higher external funding as 
a proportion of current health expen-
diture (11% for non-FCAS and 19% for 
FCAS in lower middle-income countries; 
3% for non-FCAS and 9% for FCAS in 
upper middle-income countries). In post-
conflict settings, there is also increasing 
reliance on external financing [30]. 
Indeed, external support may need to 
increase over time in order to support the 
expansion of service provision [13]. 
  Even where there are efforts to pool 
numerous sources of external fun-
ding, funding for humanitarian and 
development activities still tend to flow 
and be managed separately from each 
other within the same country. The 
Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund (HF) is 
a pooled funding mechanism established 
in 2014 specifically for humanitarian 
activities; NGOs can apply directly for 
funding [31]. Under the overall authority 
of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), 
it gives the HC greater ability to target 
funds to the most critical humanitarian 
needs, and enable efficient, rapid 
response to unforeseen events. However, 
there is no explicit coordination between 
the health projects supported through 
this Fund and the System Enhancement 
for Health Action in Transition (SEHAT) 
project financed through the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund [32].
4.  THE HEALTH FINANCING 
SETTING IN FCAS
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  Increased dependence on external 
financing brings with it influence over 
plans, policies and implementation 
capacity, which can be either supportive 
or undermining of local leadership, 
systems, and capacity, depending on 
the circumstances [33]. Financing tends 
to follow the agendas of funding agencies 
particularly where the local state is weak 
[34, 35]. As noted earlier, external funding 
tends to be separated into one stream for 
development assistance, and another for 
emergency/humanitarian response work, 
each with their respective staffing, policies, 
implementation arrangements etc. The 
Humanitarian Development Nexus 
agenda aims to mitigate the problems of 
fragmentation and incoherence which can 
result from this.
  A number of mechanisms have been 
employed to better coordinate external 
funds for longer term rehabilitation and 
development assistance. These include 
Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), the 
use of sector-wide approaches (SWAps) 
and ‘state-building contracts’ used by 
the EU [36]. Multi Donor Trust Funds 
(MDTF) have been the most commonly 
adopted approach in FCAS, including in 
Afghanistan and Sudan [37].
  Country-Based Pooled Humanitarian 
Funds (CBPHFs) have been established 
in many countries to coordinate 
external funds for humanitarian 
responses. CBPHFs provide a mechanism 
to allow the rapid allocation of resources 
in unpredictable or volatile contexts where 
priorities and programmatic focus shift 
rapidly and are multisectoral in nature. 
An essential feature is that funds are 
not earmarked and can be reallocated 
to interventions considered the highest 
priority under Humanitarian Response 
Plans (HRPs) [38]. Flexible funding 
through CBPHFs gives partners the ability 
to innovate and tailor solutions to specific 
challenges.
  In 2016 the Syria Humanitarian Fund, 
a CBPHF, supported the construction of 
underground “bunkerized” hospitals 
in besieged areas to protect patients 
and medical staff from airstrikes 
and shelling. Another CBPHF, the 
Humanitarian Fund in Afghanistan, 
supported the implementation of eighteen 
health projects by fourteen partners 
focusing on a range of interventions 
including essential live-saving trauma 
care, rehabilitative care and psychosocial 
support, mobile outreach and scaled-up 
emergency obstetric and new-born care 
services [31]. However, there is often 
no explicit coordination between these 
investments and longer-term development 
programming.
4.2.		PURCHASING	HEALTH	
SERVICES:	THE	SETTING	IN	
FCAS
  As domestic public revenues fall in 
FCAS, purchasing becomes increasingly 
focused on salaries [39], with higher level 
facilities such as hospitals often capturing 
a large part of these funds, leading to 
potentially greater misalignment with 
service delivery priorities. For example, in 
DRC the share of expenditure on human 
resources for health doubled from 42% in 
2007 to more than 80% of government 
expenditures over 2009–2012, while the 
share allocated to operating expenditures 
declined from around 26% in 2007 to 8% 
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in 2013. The share of capital expenditure 
also declined from 32% in 2007 to 3% in 
2012, jumping again to 27% in 2013 [40].
  Humanitarian funding is generally 
provided on a project basis with detailed 
input-based line item budgets, and 
often go directly to international NGOs 
(INGOs), which support existing health 
providers to restore or maintain services 
through support for staff incentives, 
supplies and running costs. They may 
subcontract or partner with local NGOs 
to support service delivery. Country-
Based Pooled Funds (CBPHFs) which are 
managed by the United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) country offices require detailed 
itemized budgets [41]. The same applies 
to the Central Emergency Response 
Fund (CERF) [42]. Organizations such 
as MSF which are exclusively privately 
funded provide direct funding to clinics 
and also operate on input-based line-
item approach with strict rules about 
virements. Humanitarian NGOs mostly 
provide direct support to the delivery 
of primary health care (PHC) services, 
while reimbursing other providers for 
referral services. Direct subsidies to cover 
the removal of user fees, and the cost 
of salaries (either full salary or top-up 
payments) are also common in settings 
where government is unable or unwilling 
to pay salaries [39].
  Where there is a lack of confidence 
in government by external funders, 
preference for non-state actors, or a 
lack of capacity to deliver services, 
funds are often channelled directly 
to nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), which can increase effective 
coverage in the short term but carries the 
risk of uneven provision e.g. where NGOs 
focus on limited geographical areas, and 
the implementation of interventions with 
unsustainably high costs. This pattern 
of service delivery is most common in 
post-conflict or post-crisis settings, such 
as Haiti, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Liberia 
and South Sudan.
  Increased reliance on external revenues 
can drive greater fragmentation and 
incoherence in purchasing arrange-
ments for example, where externally 
funded NGOs directly pay for and often 
deliver health services. In DRC, for 
example, Provincial Health Authorities 
reported managing up to thirty contracts 
with externally funded organizations; 
in 2005, at least fifteen management 
units existed at the national level, each 
with its own administrative procedures 
and coordination mechanisms. In 
2010 a district health management 
team in one province received multiple 
motorcycles from different partners who 
were responding to different national 
coordination and management units, 
while a neighbouring district had no 
means of transport for supervision [43]. 
Even with a single source of funding, 
separate coordinating mechanisms may 
be established for each project [43]. The 
increased influence of external actors 
can, however, drive the adoption of new 
approaches to provider payment e.g. 
performance-based funding, which can 
play a potentially positive role [44].
  Where service provision needs to 
expand rapidly, for example in the post-
conflict recovery period, and govern-
ment lacks the capacity to respond in 
terms of infrastructure and human 
resources, contracting-out of health 
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services is frequently employed and 
supported with external develop ment 
funding. Variants of this approach have 
also been used in limited parts of a country, 
for example where government lacks 
legitimacy or authority as in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, the DRC, Liberia and South 
Sudan [13]. However, the extent to which 
this approach is appropriate or will work 
in the longer-term is unclear, especially 
when external funding decreases and 
where government ownership of this 
approach is limited. In addition, domestic 
processes to ensure the transparent award 
of contracts would need to be established, 
as well as local provider capacity to 
take up such contracts where previously 
external NGOs were involved.
  In contexts with fragmented health 
financing arrangements, limited regu-
lation by government, significant 
reliance on user fees, and a generally 
strained public sector, international 
agen cies may find it necessary to 
direct ly contract with private providers 
or to provide cash to households. 
Lebanon is an example. It has a fragmented 
and uncoordinated health care system, 
which is highly privatized [45, 46]. 
Vulnerable Lebanese citizens rely on 
public services financed through general 
taxes with widespread user fees but use 
of PHC services is limited and spending is 
concentrated on curative care. Palestinian 
refugees rely on external financing 
channelled through UNRWA with services 
provided through humanitarian agencies. 
UNHCR is responsible for the Syrian 
refugees, who rely on public services as 
well as some contracted NGOs and private 
providers [45].
  Information on population needs 
and provider performance tends 
to be limited in FCAS, making the 
link between provider payment and 
needs, outputs or outcomes more 
challenging. This is compounded by 
the way humanitarian funding flows, 
typically structured around projects with 
very short time horizons, ranging from a 
few months to a maximum of one year. 
Budget and expenditure data are often 
disconnected, with those teams managing 
staffing, procurement of medicines/
supplies etc, separate from those working 
on delivering programme activities. 
This makes performance management 
very challenging. Between international 
actors, including development and 
humanitarian sectors, sharing of data 
and coordination of monitoring is often 
poor.
  More generally, the capacity to 
regulate a pluralistic market of formal 
and informal, public and private (and 
hybrid) providers may be constrained 
by low government capacity and 
inadequate resources required for 
effective enforcement; this can lead to 
variations in both the quality and content 
of services. While the national level may 
develop policy, these may be re-shaped 
both by implementation challenges and 
by informal practices; for example, INGOs 
in Sierra Leone, whose presence and 
distribution were the legacy of a crisis 
period, developed additional incentives 
beyond the official ones through the 
provision of equipment and medicines, and 
improvements to working environment. In 
particular access to medicines is a strong 
financial incentive for health workers if 
there is room for misappropriation and 
informal sale [47].
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4.3.  BENEFIT ENTITLEMENTS 
AND CO-PAYMENT: THE 
SETTING IN FCAS
  The very notion of a benefit entitlement 
is incongruous in many FCAS settings, 
although humanitarian agencies have 
for a number of years developed and 
provided minimum standards [48] 
for specific health services, such as 
the Minimum Initial Service Package 
(MISP) for reproductive services5. In 
many settings these predefined packages 
are aspirational with access to services 
often dependent on personal and family 
resources, including remittances from 
overseas, contacts and networks [50]. 
While public or humanitarian policy 
may offer entitlements in theory, their 
realization is dependent on available 
funding and effective implementation. In 
the DRC a list of services to be provided 
at primary and secondary levels is defined 
nationally but does not correspond to 
effective entitlements for the population, 
which vary based on the external funding 
source and local preferences.
  Increasingly, and in part driven by 
the increased involvement of external 
agencies, explicit basic packages of 
health services have been introduced in 
5	 	The	Minimum	Initial	Service	Package	(MISP)	for	
reproductive	health	is	a	set	of	priority	activities	included	
in	the	SPHERE	Handbook	with	a	recommendation	to	
implement	at	the	onset	of	a	humanitarian	crisis,	and	later	
expanded	into	a	more	comprehensive	package.	These	life-
saving	activities	form	the	starting	point	for	reproductive	
health	programming	to	be	sustained	throughout	protracted	
crises	and	the	recovery	period.	For	more	information	see	
the	Inter-Agency	Working	Group	on	Reproductive	Health	
in	Crises	49.	Inter-Agency	Working	Group	on	Reproductive	
Health	in	Crises.	The	Minimum	Initial	Service	Package	
(MISP)	for	reproductive	health	(RH),.	2019	[cited	2019	30	
April	2019];	Available	from:	http://iawg.net/areas-of-focus/
misp/.	
a number of FCAS. This is particularly the 
case in the post-conflict or reconstruction 
phase, and often goes hand-in-hand with 
a move to contract-out the delivery of 
services to NGOs. Examples of explicit 
entitlements can be found in Afghanistan, 
Liberia, South Sudan, Somalia, DRC and 
Cambodia. In some of these countries 
there are several development-oriented 
pooled mechanisms funding different 
entitlements, and in conflict settings there 
may be different packages implemented 
by humanitarian partners, with the scope 
and mix of services delivered determined 
by available funds, as well as operational 
and security constraints [51].
  In Iran, registered refugees have similar 
entitlements as Iranian citizens. This 
includes practically free access to PHC 
services, including antenatal care, family 
planning, vaccination and treatment for 
TB. In addition, UNHCR and government 
have assisted a large portion of the 
refugees (40% of registered refugees in 
2011) to enrol into a health insurance 
scheme. UNHCR makes three different 
payments into the scheme: 1) a lump sum 
to reduce the overall premium for refugees 
(down to USD1.43/month in 2011); 2) 
the premiums of approximately 10-15% 
of those refugees who are considered 
vulnerable; and 3) part or all of the 
co-payments for vulnerable refugees [52, 
53].
  Out-of-pocket charges at the point of 
service use can constitute a significant 
barrier to accessing health services; 
even where basic health care services 
are officially free at the point of service 
other costs e.g. transport, may hinder 
access to services. Over the past decade, 
many countries addressed these issues 
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by transitioning to free health services, 
with previous fee revenue replaced 
by increased prepaid revenues from 
government or external sources. These 
initiatives have been put in place for the 
entire population or for specific groups, 
such as pregnant women, children, and 
people with certain illnesses. Irrespective 
of official policies, however, in several 
countries (e.g. Guinea, CAR, Jordan, and 
DRC), direct patient payments at the point 
of delivery continue to be demanded from 
the most vulnerable groups, including 
refugees and displaced populations [54]. 
User fees are being (re)introduced in 
countries, including Afghanistan, having 
previously been removed to address 
financial barriers faced by patients [55]. 
4.4.		CASH	AND	VOUCHER	
ASSISTANCE: THE SETTING 
IN FCAS
  Cash and voucher assistance (CVA) 
has been used in both FCAS and non-
FCAS settings to stimulate demand 
for specific services and to reduce 
financial barriers to accessing services, 
especially for reproductive care6. A 
number of types of CVA exist, and can be 
defined as conditional or unconditional, 
and as restricted or unrestricted7. In 
6	 	Conditional	cash	transfers	refer	to	activities	or	obligations	
that	must	be	fulfilled	to	receive	assistance;	in	contrast,	
vouchers,	or	restricted	cash	transfers	limit	the	use	of	the	
assistance	received	i.e.	what	a	cash	transfer	can	be	spent	
on	after	the	recipient	receives	it.	See	56.	World	Health	
Organization	and	Global	Health	Cluster	Cash	Task	Team,	
Working	paper	for	considering	cash	transfer	programming	
for	health	in	humanitarian	contexts.	2018:	Geneva,	
Switzerland.
7	 	For	more	detail	on	types	of	cash-based	interventions	and	
their	comparison,	including	voucher	programming,	see	56.	
Ibid.
countries such as Yemen and Pakistan, 
vouchers have been used with some 
success to increase access to family 
planning by poor households from public 
and private facilities [57]. In Yemen, 
despite worsening conditions in 2014, a 
voucher intervention was able to channel 
funds to facilities at a time when funds 
flowing were highly erratic, enabling drug 
stock-outs to be addressed at the local 
level, and the delivery of critical maternal 
newborn health services for poor women 
and their families to be maintained [58]. 
However, there are preconditions for their 
effectiveness, including the availability 
and quality of services, and adequate 
capacity to manage a voucher scheme.
  In Syria, 18,000 women received 
maternal and reproductive services 
through a voucher scheme. The pro-
gramme resulted in an increase in the 
use of antenatal and post-natal care, 
and institutional delivery, allowed 
women to choose providers, improved 
equitable access to services, improved 
staff and women’s satisfaction and led 
to a reduction in turn-over of health 
professionals. The main challenges related 
to targeting the population most in need, 
controlling overbilling and unnecessary 
procedures, persistent security barriers 
and difficulties in accessing health 
facilities, difficulty in monitoring activity 
in private sector hospitals, and finding 
adequate financial resources [59].
  In Afghanistan, a conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) intervention in 2009-
2011 was evaluated and found to be 
successful in stimulating demand for 
MCH services and increasing use of 
targeted services, in particular when 
both families and community health 
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workers were targeted [60]. However, 
there was also evidence of non-economic 
barriers to care which impeded women’s 
access [61].
  There is growing interest in and use 
of cash transfers in humanitarian con-
texts in particular multipurpose cash 
transfers (MPCT). MPCTs are either a 
recurrent or single cash transfer to fully or 
partially cover a household’s basic needs 
which include (but are not limited to) food 
security, livelihoods, shelter, water and 
sanitation, protection, health, nutrition 
and education [62]. While the volume 
of MPCT currently accounts for no more 
than 6% of total humanitarian assistance 
[63], there is currently a push to increase 
their use following commitments under 
the Grand Bargain Agenda for Humanity.8
  However, being both unrestricted 
and unconditional, MPCTs do not 
specifically promote equitable access 
to health services. Health needs 
and related treatment costs are not 
distributed equally across the popu-
lation which necessitates the pooling 
of risks through pre-paid revenue 
arrangements, particularly for high-
cost care. Furthermore, individuals may 
use cash for priorities other than health, 
and MPCTs have no direct potential to 
influence service quality, as can exist 
under voucher schemes with provider 
accreditation or competition. Many post-
cash distribution surveys indicate that 
8	 	Commitments	under	the	Grand	Bargain	recommend	that	
‘cash	should	be	considered	equally	and	systematically	
alongside	other	forms	of	humanitarian	assistance,	and	
where	cash	is	considered	feasible,	it	should	be	the	preferred	
and	default	modality’.	64.	The	Agenda	for	Humanity,	The	
Grand	Bargain	–	A	Shared	Commitment	to	Better	Serve	
People	in	Need.	2016:	Istanbul,	Turkey.	
households use MPCTs for health services 
as the second or third main use, despite 
a clear commitment under to ensure that 
essential services are provided free at the 
point of delivery [65].
4.5.		PUBLIC	FINANCIAL	
MANAGEMENT: THE 
SETTING IN FCAS
  Weak domestic public financial 
management systems in FCAS, or a lack 
of trust by external funders in them, 
contri bute to many of the challenges 
out lined above. Critical bottlenecks 
in public financial management 
(PFM) systems include a weak budget 
formulation process, including an 
absence of budget proposals, excessive 
use of off-budget procedures, late 
approvals, weak execution, and overuse 
of exceptional procedures [66, 67]. 
Dependence on development partner’s 
disbursements schedule and a lack of 
budget implementation tracking are also 
common in FCAS [68]. As with many of 
the challenges identified, these are not 
unique to FCAS settings but are often 
more extreme.
  PFM systems are often highly frag-
mented in FCAS, with parallel cash flows 
and procurement systems driven in part 
by an increased reliance on external 
funders, NGOs etc. This comprises a 
major source of inefficiency [69], in terms 
of ensuring that resources are used in a 
way which maximizes health gain; Porter 
et al [70] highlight how PFM systems in 
FCAS often develop asymmetrically, with 
formal aspects of modern systems layered 
with informal arrangements, and modern 
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PFM mechanisms applied only to a small 
part of the revenue sources.
  In post-conflict settings a number of 
countries have relied heavily on external 
capacity to substitute for PFM capacity 
deficits [71]. A key difference compared 
to approaches in non-fragile environments 
is the fact that capacity substitution and 
supplementation (donor-paid staff in line 
positions and use of top-ups) have been 
used to a significant extent in many post-
conflict environments. PFM is often given 
priority in the early recovery period given 
its importance in strengthening capacity, 
transparency and accountability, and 
as a result driving future support from 
bilateral and multilateral external funders. 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone, have made significant progress in 
PFM reforms and have relied on extensive 
capacity substitution in the short-term 
[71]. These reforms can contribute to 
the institution-building objectives and 
contribute to regular payment of salaries 
of civil servants. However, the reliance 
on external support poses a challenge for 
longer-term sustainability, particularly in 
the lower-income countries.
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5.1.	 	REVENUE	RAISING	AND	
POOLING IN FCAS: POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS
  Given reduced fiscal capacity in many 
FCAS, or the unwillingness of govern-
ment to invest in affected areas, 
external funding for both humanitarian 
and development programmes plays 
a critical role in maintaining the 
public nature of funding for health 
services, which in turn is critical to 
protect access to essential services. At the 
same time, efforts to maintain domestic 
revenue raising capacity is important as 
an investment in state-building, for the 
resilience of the health system, and for its 
longer-term progress towards UHC [72].
  Coordinating the flow and use of 
external funds is a priority given their 
increased significance and in FCAS. 
Both CBPHFs and MDTFs significantly 
improve the coordination of external 
funds and have been pivotal in minimizing 
fragmentation, duplication, and preventing 
unnecessary complexity in the health 
system. However, from the Humanitarian 
Development Nexus perspective and the 
longer-term development of the health 
system, it is important that the processes 
and policies inherent in these two vehicles 
are harmonized both with each other, and 
with existing government systems.
  Under certain circumstances inter-
national rules may prohibit the direct 
financing of governments [73]. As a 
result, there is often a greater emphasis 
on coordinating with, rather than 
working through government channels 
[74], particularly when the capacity or 
authority of government, or indeed trust, 
is considered to be low. Fragmented 
authority within government in FCAS 
can also seriously hinder the political 
dialogue necessary with external funders 
to increase budgetary support [75].
  Shared sovereignty over public funds 
between the re-emerging state and 
exter nal funders can lock in PFM 
systems improvements but requires 
care ful exit planning to ensure 
sustainability [71]. In some post-conflict 
countries such as Kosovo and Liberia, 
joint sovereignty over public funding for 
services was important for the legitimacy 
of the state; incentives to maintain a 
close relationship with the international 
community were also strong. Such 
temporary arrangements can offer a win-
win opportunity for new governments, 
citizens, and the international community.
  The potential advantages from donor 
coordination and harmonization in 
terms of pooling arrangements in FCAS 
are similar to those in non-FCAS [76]. 
These include allowing operations on a 
larger scale, lowering transaction costs, 
improving dialogue with the government, 
and greater capacity development in 
general, including for service delivery. 
5.  REFLECTIONS ON HEALTH 
FINANCING POLICY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION IN FCAS
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Similarly, coordinated revenues can 
improve both the predictability and 
stability of fund flow to frontline health 
services. 
  Even when there are challenges in 
the implementation of pooled funding 
arrangements in FCAS there can be 
considerable value from an institution-
building perspective. An independent 
evaluation of the Multi Donor Trust 
Fund in South Sudan, into which the 
government contributed significant 
financial resources, found that the 
greatest positive impact was in terms of 
institution and capacity building through 
the development of legislation and other 
systems for implementation, rather than 
health related outputs and outcomes 
[77]. Challenges tend to include high 
administrative costs, slow disbursement, 
poor results, which in turn can lead to 
external funding reverting to parallel 
channels [76]. Trade-offs exist on a 
number of issues, including delivering 
services rapidly and working through 
government systems to build capacity; 
low tolerance of fiduciary risk versus 
capacity development; and external 
funders focusing on their own visibility 
at the expense of enhancing government 
ownership, alignment, and use of country 
systems [76]. Pooling external funds 
from different humanitarian agencies 
for specific purposes, such as centralized 
procurement of the supplies, starts to 
reduce fragmentation and increase the 
harmonization and alignment of supply 
chain management systems.
  Efforts to increase domestic funding 
through contributory-based systems 
are unlikely to be beneficial and may 
prove problematic in the longer-term. 
Contributory-based schemes, whether 
compulsory or voluntary, profit or non-
profit, have limited impact on revenues 
in countries where most employment is 
informal i.e. non-salaried, and run the 
risk of increasing fragmentation and 
increasing inequalities by establishing 
separate more generous schemes for 
higher-income individuals [78, 79]. 
However, while a new funding source 
does not require a new purchasing agency 
to be established, it may be politically 
difficult to introduce such an institution 
without a new earmarked funding source. 
In such cases, a dedicated revenue stream 
(whether from traditional contributory 
mechanisms, a new earmarked tax, or 
external funds) may be needed as part 
of a reform to build purchasing capacity 
within any newly formed institution e.g. 
a health insurance fund, or within the 
MoH, can be particularly valuable for the 
longer-term development of the health 
system.
  Supporting domestic PFM systems and 
processes represents a core investment 
which strengthens health system 
func tioning as contributes to future 
resilience. While channelling external 
funds through national systems often 
comes with higher fiduciary risk than 
directly through projects or NGOs, these 
risks can be managed. Strengthening 
national capacity for procurement, 
accounting and auditing, reporting and 
programme implementation is part of the 
solution but requires time, and may not 
be the priority during settings of extreme 
fragility or deficits in government capacity 
[80]. However, once risks are considered 
manageable, efforts should be made to 
support national systems; CBPHFs and 
MDTFs should progressively align with 
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national priorities and seek to consolidate 
smaller projects into scalable national 
programmes.
  When refugees need more expensive 
health services, these should ideally 
be covered through existing pooling 
arrange ments, as in Iran. UNHCR 
promotes the use of health insurance for 
refugees, and wherever possible existing 
national schemes, although recognizes 
that this is often only possible for those 
resident in the medium to long term [52]. 
More broadly, UNHCR advocates for 
refugees to access PHC and emergency 
services in the same way as nationals, 
which may include services free at the 
point of service.
5.2.		PURCHASING	HEALTH	
SERVICES	POLICY	IN	FCAS:	
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
  Financing common goods for 
health9 such as disease surveillance, 
information systems, enforcement of 
health protection laws and regulations, 
and planning and management of 
national strategies for health security, is 
a priority in all settings, but particularly 
in FCAS given the increased health risks. 
Common goods for health are largely 
population-based functions that require 
collective financing. These goods have a 
9	 	Traditionally,	many	of	these	common	goods	for	health	
(e.g.	surveillance,	regulations,	subsidies	to	address	large	
market	failures)	have	been	referred	to	as	essential	public	
health	functions.	However,	as	described	in	the	paragraph	
above,	these	are	not	always	the	same	and	common	goods	
for	health	have	several	distinct	criteria.	For	more	detailed	
discussion	of	the	topic	see:	81.	Smith,	P.C.,	A.	Yazbeck,	and	
A.	Soucat,	When	markets	fail:	the	case	for	common	goods 
Health	Systems	&	Reform,	forthcoming.
large impact on human life and, due to 
their inherent market failure, necessitate 
public financing. As governments in FCAS 
settings are often unable or unwilling to 
finance these goods, external funding 
from humanitarian and development 
sources can be critical. 
  While a guiding principle of health 
financing policy is to move away 
from input-based line item provider 
payment, in FCAS ensuring basic inputs 
are in place is greater priority than 
introducing complex payment systems. 
Line-item budgets are useful when 
purchaser and provider management 
capacity is low, in particular for financial 
management and monitoring [82]. In 
2017 eight out of ten countries at the 
bottom of the Corruption Perception 
Index [83] were also considered fragile 
[21]; in this context ensuring that public 
funds are spent for authorized purposes 
and ensuring the timely disbursement of 
salaries and key operating expenditures, 
is the highest priority. 
  In some settings, however, relatively 
simple output-based payment mecha-
nisms can play a role as part of 
strategies to reduce out-of-pocket 
payments and promote access for the 
poor, while building the foundation 
for more strategic purchasing. 
Cambodia presents an informative case 
of purchasing reform, in which Health 
Equity Funds (HEFs) reimburse providers 
for foregone user fees, removing a 
significant financial barrier to access for 
vulnerable households. Initiated by NGOs 
and supported by development partners 
in the early 2000s, HEFs have been scaled 
up nationwide with the government 
taking over their administration under 
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the Payment Certification Agency. The 
Government now accounts for more 
than half of the funding required for the 
HEFs. In terms of strategic directions, the 
GoC’s National Social Protection Policy 
Framework 2016–2025 (dated August 
2016) proposes the establishment of a 
single payer for all the various schemes, 
including the Health Equity Funds [84].
  Pay-for-performance (P4P) can be 
important in getting resources to front-
line providers but has been difficult 
and costly to implement in FCAS [85, 
86] and therefore, should be carefully 
considered. It is advisable to review the 
current approaches to its implementation 
in low- and middle-income countries, 
including FCAS, and consider how these 
can be adjusted to each context, weighting 
carefully risks and implementation costs, 
including verification approaches [85, 87]. 
Moreover, existing evidence demonstrates 
that P4P works best when it is part of a 
blended payment system with a base 
payment (e.g. salaries, fee-for-service, 
capitation) still playing the main role 
[88, 89]. 
  Pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives 
need to coordinate with the broader 
health financing system and used to 
focusing multiple funding streams 
around a common set of priority services. 
P4P schemes are often implemented by 
agencies which operate independently in 
delineated geographic areas [85]. Bertone 
et al. 2018 found such schemes being 
implemented in 23 countries defined 
as FCAS, largely driven by external 
organizations. In a few countries, P4P 
provided a mechanism to streamline donor 
assistance around a package of priority 
health services [85, 90].
  Where new initiatives such as P4P can 
only be implemented in more stable and 
secure parts of a country, it important 
that as soon as fragile settings stabilize, 
these mechanisms are also extended to 
these areas, to improve coherence across 
the health system. There also needs to be 
flexibility to shift back to simpler mostly 
input-based financing if the situation 
deteriorates. A concerted effort is needed 
to prevent divergence in health system 
development which may be perpetuated 
in the longer-term and embed inequalities 
for example in terms of the distribution of 
health staff, and service quality.
  Where possible, separate purchasing 
arrangements should not be established 
for each source of funds, which is a risk 
when the number of external grants 
increases significantly. Examples of 
purchasers include Health Equity Funds, 
RBF Units, Programme Management Units 
(PMUs), health insurance agencies and 
humanitarian NGOs, all of which purchase 
health services on behalf of the population 
using prepaid resources, whether external 
or domestic. Where separate funding, 
in particular from humanitarian and 
development sources, inevitably leads 
to separate purchasing arrangements, 
harmonizing underlying policies within 
and between is critical both for short-term 
coordination, and for the development 
of a coherent approach to purchasing in 
the longer term. Examples include using 
common or coordinated pay or incentive 
scales for health workers, and a common 
or coordinated approach to both tariffs 
and payment methods for providers, such 
as harmonized reimbursement for referral 
and admission costs.
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  While limiting the number of INGOs 
supporting a specific geographical 
area can help to reduce fragmented 
approaches in purchasing, it is important 
that all areas follow a coordinated 
approach and advance towards further 
harmonization of purchasing in the 
humanitarian response between partners 
supporting service delivery. This would 
create similar increase in efficiency and 
effectiveness as seen through contracting 
with development pooled funding
  It is important that short-term solu-
tions do not generate longer-term 
problems, for example by establishing 
parallel systems with no vision of how 
these will eventually transition into 
domestically owned and managed 
systems. Challenges remain, however, 
particularly in relation to the retention of 
highly qualified staff as they transition to 
civil servant status [91]. In Afghanistan, 
an alternative approach was used in the 
years following conflict, in which a Grant 
and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU) 
was established within the MoPH. This 
unit pooled external funds and followed 
the financial management rules of the 
funding agencies. In 2009, the GCMU was 
restructured into the Health Economics 
and Financing Directorate (HEFD) of the 
MoPH with a broader scope of work, and 
the objective to strengthen the capacity of 
the MoPH [92].
  Contracting NGOs to deliver health 
services using pooled funding, for 
example during the transition from 
humanitarian relief to the early-
recovery phase, can help to build 
domestic capacity for purchasing. In 
South Sudan, external funds were pooled 
and used to support PHC in ten states, 
with one NGO designated as the lead in 
each county [93]. In Liberia, the Health 
Sector Pool Fund (HSPF) supported 
the extension of the Basic Package of 
Health Services (BPHS) to most public 
health facilities by 2010, together with 
a facility accreditation process. The 
HSPF also helped to build domestic 
ownership and facilitated coordination 
between government, local NGOs, and 
international NGOs by enabling the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to 
develop service contracts [94]. Service 
access was extended as a result, although 
remained limited for those living in rural 
areas [95].
  Experience with the contracting-out of 
services delivery indicates that quality 
can be considerably improved within a 
short period of time [96-98]. The extent to 
which this approach promotes the longer-
term development of the health system 
depends on the details of implementation. 
Where possible, government should be 
actively engaged in the management of 
NGOs, who are often only accountable 
to the external agencies funding and 
contracting them; this approach helps 
to strengthen government authority and 
capacity rather than undermine it. Where 
government’s authority is contested and 
there is an issue of legitimacy, contracting-
out or direct provision may be the only 
feasible option. However, measures 
should be put in place for transition to 
government-managed arrangements in 
the future, as was the case in Cambodia.
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5.3.  BENEFITS AND 
ENTITLEMENT POLICY 
IN FCAS: POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS
  When implemented effectively, explicit 
statements of a population’s entitle-
ments can help to focus resources on 
priority interventions, address geo-
graphical inequities, and improve 
align ment across purchasers and 
providers [11, 99]. Basic or essential 
packages of health services have been 
introduced in many post-conflict settings 
such as Afghanistan, Liberia, South 
Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, and Cambodia, 
although they often remain aspirational 
and unrealistic [50]. Other advantages 
can include a rapid increase in service 
coverage and a standardization of services, 
facilities, staffing, drugs and equipment 
[96, 100, 101].
  Standard benefit packages such as 
DCP3 can be a useful starting point in 
FCAS although, as noted above, these 
need to be adapted to each setting. 
The Disease Control Priorities (DCP3) 
programme has proposed both a highest-
priority package (HPP) and a larger 
Essential UHC Package [102], which have 
been used as the basis for adaptation at 
the regional and country level, including 
in FCAS [103], both across and within 
countries, and recognizing the history of a 
health system in terms of service delivery 
design, policies, capacities etc. Evidence 
indicates that even the HPP is not always 
realistic in FCAS settings and requires 
further prioritization.
  It is important to differentiate between 
benefit decisions as the basis for 
orga nizing service provision, which 
need to be detailed, from benefit 
entitlement decisions as the basis for 
communication to the population which 
should not be overly detailed. While the 
principle of common benefit entitlements 
across the population is important from 
the perspective of UHC, in practice it is 
important to adapt services and delivery 
platforms to the diverse and dynamic 
contexts often found within a country. 
Examples included the network approach 
to adapted referral pathways in north-
west Syria, and the clustering of districts 
for referral in Yemen.
  Coordinating benefit entitlements as 
far as possible, across FCAS and non-
FCAS settings within a country, and 
progressively moving towards common 
entitlements and effective coverage for 
the entire population, is central to UHC. 
While it is unrealistic to deliver a set of 
common benefit entitlements nationally 
when certain geographical areas are 
fragile or in conflict, it is important to 
progressively reach out to populations 
living in insecure and hard to reach areas 
as soon as feasible.
  Maintaining core processes for benefit 
design in FCAS to the extent possible 
is important, including data, dialogue, 
and political decision [104]. In FCAS, 
obtaining the necessary data may be more 
difficult, and similarly dialogue with 
stakeholders, and political decisions by 
government. Nevertheless, maintaining 
these criteria and processes to the extent 
possible, even when external funding 
and actors play an increased role, is 
important given they constitute the fabric 
of institutions central to the longer-term 
development of the health system.
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  Core messages on benefit design with 
respect to ensuring clarity and trans-
parency regarding entitlements are 
equally important in FCAS, where 
health needs tend to increase. While 
being explicit about benefit entitlements 
and related conditions of access is central 
to ensuring transparency, this should 
not be confused with being detailed; 
defining a long list of service entitlements, 
particularly at the PHC level, can create 
greater uncertainty for the population, as 
well as for providers. Making all services 
available at a PHC facility free at the point 
of services is an example of an explicit, 
transparent entitlement, without being 
overly-detailed.
  Services for refugees should ideally 
be managed through existing national 
schemes, rather than through parallel 
systems. Increasingly, UNHCR advises the 
use of national service delivery channels 
rather than establishing parallel services 
for refugees [52]. From a health system 
perspective, and considering the issues 
raised by the humanitarian development 
nexus, incorporating refugees within 
national health care systems is, wherever 
possible likely to be more efficient and 
sustainable. As mentioned earlier, in 
Uganda refugees were allowed to develop 
settlements in rural areas and had access 
to clinics which also served the local 
populations, an approach which worked 
well over time [105]. 
  While the use of existing public 
services by refugees is ideal, in some 
cases this will strain already over-
stretched health services unless 
action is taken to strengthen capacity. 
The poorest communities in northern 
Lebanon have received many of the most 
vulnerable Syrian refugees, negatively 
affecting access to basic services for the 
host population [46]. UNHCR and other 
humanitarian agencies can play a key 
role in improving health services not 
only for refugees but also for vulnerable 
host communities. UNHCR has adopted a 
public health approach which prioritizes 
affordable and accessible basic PHC and 
emergency care, over costlier and complex 
treatments and hospital care, with the 
aim of ensuring coverage for the greatest 
number of refugees in Lebanon [106]. The 
approach to strengthening prevention and 
primary care services with strict referral 
systems has the potential to catalyse 
broader health system reforms.
5.4.		CASH	AND	VOUCHER	
ASSISTANCE: POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS
  SDG indicator 3.8.2 measures financial 
protection which in turn requires 
re ducing reliance on out-of-pocket 
pay ments; this principle is particularly 
pertinent in FCAS settings where 
population vulnerability tends to increase 
and household ability to pay reduces. In 
humanitarian and complex emergencies, 
there is an agreed interagency policy to 
suspend user fees for essential health 
care services [65]. A number of studies 
in FCAS settings highlight the potential 
of population-based exemptions and 
negative effects of user fees in FCAS [107, 
108].
  In settings where out-of-pocket pay-
ments persist or re-emerge, CVA can 
be used to reduce financial barriers 
to accessing services while mitigation 
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measures are put in place through 
improved revenue raising, pooling and 
purchasing as described above [56]. 
These can also be used to offset other costs, 
such as transportation, or opportunity 
cost of time, and can empower the service 
users. Existing research from FCAS and 
non-FCAS shows the general effectiveness 
of these interventions in improving service 
utilization.
  Vouchers can improve service utilization 
for target populations and services 
in certain FCAS settings. A number of 
studies demonstrate the effectiveness of 
vouchers in stimulating service use [57, 
109], particularly among women and 
children [59]. There is evidence that 
competitive vouchers schemes can drive 
up the quality and efficiency of service 
delivery by both public and private 
providers and contribute to equity, as in 
the case of Nicaragua [110]. In addition, 
monitoring contracts with providers 
requires greater information reporting, 
strengthening the health information 
system in the process; they may also 
help to strengthen systems for financial 
management and quality management 
but can be expensive and time-consuming 
to establish [56]. This approach has been 
successfully used in acute emergencies in 
Syria and Yemen.
  Conditional cash transfers in 
development contexts can significantly 
stimulate demand and increase use of 
preventive services but need to be better 
understood in humanitarian contexts 
[111-113]. Conditional cash transfers are 
typically a component of social support 
programmes, which make regular cash 
payments to poor households conditional 
on the use of certain health services 
and school attendance. Introducing 
conditionalities requires new systems to 
monitor compliance, which has financial 
and administrative costs. In some cases, 
negative side effects have been identified, 
such as the unfair penalization of families 
who cannot comply with the conditions 
for reasons beyond their control.
  While research shows that multipurpose 
cash transfers (MPCTs) can improve 
access to commodities [114], non-
health sector products (e.g. food) with 
health benefits, increase choice for 
beneficiaries, enhance dignity, and have 
a beneficial effect on local economic 
activity, there are concerns that over-
reliance on this instrument will divert 
resources from other actions needed to 
improve access to health services. Most 
studies of cash-based approaches focus on 
non-health benefits, such as food security; 
a recent review concludes that in terms of 
transaction costs, cash transfers can be an 
efficient way of providing humanitarian 
assistance. Unconditional, unrestricted 
cash transfer programmes have a lower 
cost per beneficiary than vouchers which, 
in turn, have a lower cost per beneficiary 
than in-kind food distribution [115]. A 
variety of card-based systems and mobile 
transfers can also reduce costs and be 
implemented rapidly. However, in relation 
to health care, unconditional, unrestricted 
cash transfers may not work as well as 
they do for food, in particular for high 
cost care [56]; the unpredictable nature 
of need for such care means that cash 
should be considered as a supplement to, 
and not a substitute for, pooled funding 
arrangements.
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  Where the value of MPCTs includes 
costs related to accessing health 
services, they should be seen as com-
plementary assistance to supply-side 
efforts to improve health services, 
ensuring consistency with current 
agree ments to provide essential health 
services free at the point of access 
[65]. However, in practice even essential 
services are often not free at the point of 
service, with households often reporting 
using MPCTs to pay for health services; 
further evidence is required to understand 
exactly what people spend MPCTs on 
in FCAS, but ideally these are only to 
be used to cover indirect costs such as 
transport, and services not considered to 
be essential.
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Since 2000 there has been a growing attention 
in the literature and beyond on fragility, both 
in terms of fragile states, but also fragile 
settings within states, with a wide variety of 
interpretations of the concept by academics 
and international agencies. A summary of the 
main categorizations of fragility are presented 
below, with further details available in the 
literature review:
  the OECD (OECD 2016) assesses fragile 
or extremely fragile contexts using five 
dimensions (economic, environment, 
political, security, and societal). A context 
may be moderately fragile when it comes 
to security, but extremely fragile in 
political and societal aspects; 56 contexts 
are characterized by the OECD as either 
“extremely fragile” (high fragility in all 
of the five dimensions noted above as 
well as widespread armed conflict or very 
significant levels of collective violence) 
or “fragile” (fragility in all of the five 
dimensions except low violence). In 
summary the OECD writes that states are 
fragile when its “….structures lack political 
will and/or capacity to provide the basic 
functions needed for poverty reduction, 
development, or safeguarding the security 
and human rights of their populations.” 
  the World Bank (2018) has published the 
Harmonized List of Fragile Situations 
since 2011 with the 2018 list including 36 
settings, from Afghanistan and Eritrea to 
DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Myanmar; 
several countries with from subnational 
conflicts, or other factors which affect 
fragility, are not on the list because 
they neither have a Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
score below the cut-off (3.200) nor a 
peacekeeping or political/peace-building 
mission.
  The United Kingdom Aid Strategy 
(2015) provides a list of 54 fragile states, 
distinguishing between “high fragility” 
e.g. Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, “moderate 
fragility” e.g. Angola, Azerbaijan, Kenya 
and Kyrgyzstan, and “low fragility” 
e.g. Djibouti, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania 
and Ukraine. In addition, ten countries, 
including Armenia, Jordan and Tanzania, 
were listed as “neighbouring ‘high 
fragility’ states”. 
  Though not conceptualized around 
the concept of fragility, WHO grades 
emergencies into three categories based 
on the extent, complexity and duration 
of organizational and or external support 
required. The grading of an emergency 
triggers WHO’s Emergency Response 
Procedures and emergency policies, and 
prompts all WHO offices at all levels to 
repurpose resources in order to provide 
support: http://www.who.int/hac/donor-
info/g3_contributions/en/
  The G7+ has embarked on its own index 
for measuring state fragility, identifying 
five clusters (political legitimacy, justice, 
security, economic foundation, revenue 
and services), which are located on a 
fragility “spectrum”, containing five 
stages. There are currently 20 countries: 
ANNEX	1:	INSTITUTIONAL	
CLASSIFICATIONS OF FRAGILITY
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Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, 
Papua New Guinea, São Tomé e Príncipe, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, 
South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and 
Yemen.
COMMON CONCEPTS 
UNDERPINNING	LITERATURE	
ON FRAGILITY
CAPACITY AND WILLINGNESS
The health sector is most obviously affected 
by the first, service delivery-oriented domain, 
but the domains connect, in that in the absence 
of security and a trusted public authority, 
sustained and effective service delivery will 
not be possible. 
The service delivery function includes wide-
ranging components, such as effectiveness, 
capacity to execute policies, capacities in 
stewardship, coordination, and leadership, 
institutional capacity, and the achievement of 
equity of services across populations (Witter 
et al., 2015). Service provision is a highly 
political issue: by delivering services the state 
makes itself visible, strengthens its social 
contract and increases its legitimacy with its 
citizens (Eldon et al., 2008; Van de Walle and 
Scott, 2009). However, this is an area in need 
of research as available evidence about the 
causal relationship between service provision 
and state-building is limited (Ndaruhutse 
et al., 2012). Mcloughlin (2012) stresses 
how failure to deliver basic services such as 
security, health, education and justice is both 
a cause of fragility and a characteristic of 
fragile states. The consequences of fragility 
for service delivery are well documented 
and include inequitable coverage of services 
provided to populations, and breakdown of 
accountability (World Bank, 2004).
SECURITY
Conflict is a core characteristic of many fragile 
states (hence the use of the common acronym 
FCAS) as conflict undermines delivery 
of all three core domains whose absence 
constitutes fragility. Again, relationships 
run in both directions, as fragility may also 
lead to or predict conflicts – for example, in 
countries such as Syria, where legitimacy and 
authority was disputed, even though capacity 
to deliver services was high prior to the war. 
Chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social 
tensions, and violence or the legacy of armed 
conflict and civil war are highlighted by the 
IMF as common characteristics of fragility 
(ILO, 2016). More recently, climate change 
pressures, such as natural resource scarcity, 
land use change, extreme weather events or 
volatile food prices, have become a recognized 
threat to stability too, particularly where 
government and institutions are already 
vulnerable (Rüttinger et al., 2015). 
Poor economic performance is another 
contributory factor, as well as result of 
fragility. On the World Bank’s ‘Harmonised 
list of fragile situations’ for 2017, only eight 
out of 52 fragile states are upper-middle 
income (and none high) (World Bank, 
2017b). All others are low or lower-middle 
income. Moreover, for the 20 countries which 
remained on the fragile states list for the 
entire decade (2007-17), all are low income 
or lower-middle income (Annex 3). 
The role of institutional arrangements is 
also highlighted by the literature on fragile 
states (OECD, 2016), as embodying and 
perhaps preserving the conditions of crisis: 
in economic terms, this could be institutions 
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(importantly, property rights) that reinforce 
stagnation or low growth rates, or embody 
extreme inequality (in wealth, in access 
to land, in access to the means to make 
a living); in social terms institutions may 
embody extreme inequality or lack of access 
altogether to health or education; in political 
terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary 
coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, 
or perhaps regional terms), or extreme 
factionalism or significantly fragmented 
security organizations. In fragile states, 
statutory institutional arrangements are 
vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional 
systems, be they derived from traditional 
authorities, from communities under 
conditions of stress that see little of the state 
(in terms of security, development or welfare), 
from warlords, or from other non-state power 
brokers. While specifics vary across fragile 
states, the underlying drivers can include a 
combination of ethnic fragmentation, neo-
patrimonial politics, over-reliance of the 
economy on natural resources, conflict and 
corruption (Tayler, 2005).
There is a broad literature on the drivers of 
vulnerability and fragility, and a recent surge 
in interest in the notion of resilience, which 
can be conceptualised as opposed to fragility. 
While it remains contested, there is some 
convergence in the resilience literature on 
systems which are able to respond effectively 
to acute shocks, such as conflict, natural 
disasters or epidemics (Witter et al., 2017), 
or everyday stressors (Gilson et al., 2017). 
The absorptive, adaptive and transformative 
capacities which underlie resilience require 
legitimate and effective institutions (Blanchet 
et al., 2017), amongst other features. 
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While states of fragility are dynamic one 
study which classified fragile states and 
tracked them found that 108 out of 131 
countries did not change categories over 
2000-2010 (Tikuisis et al., 2015). The DAC’s 
typology for describing fragile states is: (1) 
deteriorating state, (2) collapsed state, and 
(3) state recovering from conflict. Some 
analysts further segment the third category 
into post-conflict and early recovery stages 
(OECD, 2005). Others divide the post-conflict 
period into: emergency and stabilization (0-11 
months post-armed conflict); tran sition and 
recovery (12-47 months after the cessation of 
war); and peace and development (4-10 years 
post-armed conflict) (Ahonsi, 2010).
The World Bank LICUS group have been 
classified into four typologies: (1) prolonged 
crisis or impasse (e.g. Myanmar, Somalia, 
Zimbabwe); (2) post-conflict or political 
transition (e.g. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Liberia, Southern Sudan); (3) 
gradual improvement (e.g. Cambodia); or (4) 
deteriorating governance (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire). 
Each year the lists are revised, so fragility is a 
temporary status (AHSR, 2008).
The Global Fund has adopted the term 
‘challenging operating environments’ 
(COEs) (GFATM, 2016) – a typology more 
focused on the operational challenges to 
engagement by external actors and therefore 
arguably less political. Countries in this 
typology are grouped into those facing acute 
instability, those facing chronic instability 
with weak health systems, and those facing 
chronic instability with stronger health 
systems (Pearson et al., 2014).
Post-conflict is a simpler concept: a country 
or area is considered to be post-conflict when 
active conflict ceases and there is a political 
transformation to a recognized post-conflict 
government (Canavan et al., 2008). The 
transition to post-conflict status is however not 
linear, as political settlements often take years, 
and about 40% of countries collapse back into 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Poorer 
countries are more likely to be affected by 
conflict and are also more likely to relapse into 
conflict (Kruk et al., 2010a).
Pre-conflict is harder to assess but the ‘fragile 
states index’, produced by the Fund for Peace 
(The Fund for Peace, 2018), is one of the several 
attempts to do this, assessing vulnerability to 
collapse or conflict using 12 indicators – social 
(four), economic (two) and political (six). Using 
these, all recognized states are graded as 
sustainable, moderate (risk), warning or alert. 
Crisis Watch also provides regular updates on 
changes in conflicts and risk of conflict globally 
(International Crisis Group, 2018). Other terms 
are used which substantially overlap with FCAS, 
such as ‘disrupted’ states or systems, protracted 
crises (Pavignani and Colombo, 2009), systems 
under stress and complex emergencies. 
Complex emergencies can be defined as 
situations where conflict or acute shocks 
co-occur with multiple additional, and often 
intractable, demographic, environmental, 
economic, and social instabilities. The term 
‘complex emergency,’ though, is also used by 
humanitarian agencies to describe conflicts 
where the ‘complexity’ necessitates intervention 
by multiple agencies (The Robert S. Stauss 
Center, n.d.). 
ANNEX 2: THE DYNAMIC 
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Although there is a group of countries that 
most observers would confidently classify 
as ‘FCAS’, there is a much greater number 
that demonstrate some, but not all of the 
characteristics of “fragility”.
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